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premise underlying all law-common, statutory, regulatory; oral 
and written-not just constitutional law. Thus, the great lengths 
to which Harris goes to explore the possibility that a nation can 
be bound with words is reminiscent of angels and the pin. 
At the same time, Harris is not touched by a tension that I 
believe legal theorists do feel some concern for: the belief that, at 
the end of the day, there remains a need for a constitution to 
have some effect as law. That is, a theory must aspire ultimately 
to bear in some way on the resolution of real questions that arise 
in actual cases. Although Harris recognizes that "[t]he constitu-
tional order is not just a construction for the mind, like a work of 
fiction or poetry, or even, somewhat less emphatically, a work of 
political philosophy," he nevertheless does not consider any part 
of his abstract undertaking to include even the aspiration to an 
answer of any constitutional question. He avows that, for him, 
interpretation is "a way of looking at the political world." Sheep-
ishly, I must confess that such an approach to the project of inter-
pretation leaves me ultimately unsatisfied. 
THE MORAL TRADffiON OF AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETA· 
TION. H. Jefferson Powell.! Durham: Duke University 
Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 296. $39.00. 
Jim Chenz 
Just as the Gospel reminds Christians that "the last shall be 
first,"3 the observation that "less is more:' surely does not damn 
H. Jefferson Powell's most recent work with faint praise. In The 
Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism: A Theological 
Interpretation, Powell launches an unapologetically Christian at-
tack on America's long-standing civic faith in constitutional law. 
Powell's core message-that there is no such thing as a Christian 
approach to constitutionalism-heralds a radical and powerful 
new model for understanding the relationship between personal 
Christianity and public law. 
1. Professor of Law and Divinity, Duke University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I thank Mark Mousesian 
for his helpful comments. 
3. Matthew 19:30, 20:16; Mark 10:31; Luke 13:30 (King James). 
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The Moral Tradition enriches a growing jurisprudence not 
ashamed to call itself Christian Legal Studies.4 As the Biblical 
basis for his project, Powell chooses the familiar distinction be-
tween Caesar and God.s This concept, so often stressed in legal 
writing about religion and in religious writing about law, might 
be considered intellectually banal if it were not so thoroughly 
and frequently ignored in practice. Powell omits any direct dis-
cussion of social and legal issues popularly thought to be of spe-
cial interest to Christians. Even when discussing substantive due 
process rights to contraception and abortion,6 he never purports 
to prescribe a proper Christian view on the merits, a moralistic 
exercise in which even Supreme Court Justices sometimes in-
dulge.' Powell alludes exactly once to the agenda of the so-called 
"religious right," and in rather unflattering terms at that: "The 
heedless subservience of much of American fundamentalist 
Christianity to nineteenth-century secular ideology demonstrates 
the inevitable result of attempting to think theologically in an 
intellectual vacuum."s His refusal to conscript God in discrete 
legal and political battles starkly contradicts both the secular 
state's claim that God "has favored our undertakings"9 and reli-
gious groups' increasingly common efforts to translate abstract 
spiritual authority into tangible political power. The omission is 
conspicuous, perhaps deliberate. Powell seems to perceive a far 
graver threat than the law's episodic failure to conform to indi-
vidual Christians' political preferences. 
Powell's essential message is straightforward and striking, a 
combination of Shaker simplicity with distinctly un-Quaker ag-
gression. Powell ruthlessly honors his commitment to a "theolog-
ical" analysis of American constitutionalism based on "those 
aspects of Christian thought and action that are often separated 
4. Cf. 2 Tunothy 2:15 ("Study to show thyself approved unto God, a workman that 
needeth not to be ashamed, rightly divining the word of truth."); 1 Peter 4:16 ("Yet if any 
man suffer as a Christian, let him not be ashamed; but let him glorify God on this 
behalf."). 
5. Pp. 8 n.20, 11, 292; cf. Matthew 22:21 ("Render therefore unto Caesar the things 
which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's"); Mark 12:17; Luke 20:25. 
6. Pp. 173-81. 
7. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (arguing that "[c]ondemnation of [homosexual conduct] is firmly rooted in Judeao-
Christian moral and ethical standards"); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (concluding that the Congress of "a Christian nation" could scarcely 
have intended to restrict churches' ability to hire foreign clerics). 
8. P. 266. But cf. p. 260 n.6 ("[I)t is not the assumption or conclusion of this book 
that political activity undertaken in this polity in the name of Christ necessarily is theolog-
ically or ethically mistaken."). . . 
9. The slogan Annuit ctEptis appears on the Great Seal of the Umted States, wh1ch 
is depicted on the reverse of the dollar bill. 
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out as moral or ethical."to He doggedly poses an unfiltered ver-
sion of "the faith question" to fellow Christians:n in whom do 
you place your faith, Caesar or God? For a Christian, the ques-
tion necessarily answers itself. Powell's elaboration of the an-
swer severely undercuts conventional efforts to reconcile secular 
lawyering with Christianity. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, the resurrec-
tion of Christ does not command agreement with Judge John 
Noonan's Persons and Masks of the Law.12 Forswearing any at-
tempt to reconcile "the relation of love to power" within "the 
legal enterprise,"t3 Powell conducts a grinding assault on "[t]he 
temptation to ascribe theological value to the institutions and 
modes of thought of American constitutionalism."t4 
After declaring his disdain for "any unquestioning theologi-
cal approval" of the constitutional status quo,ts Powell merci-
lessly demonizes American constitutionalism. Although this 
tactic is less than sporting, it does help Powell focus his powers of 
demolition. Under Sanford Levinson's quasi-Christian taxon-
omy, Powell is a "catholic" in his willingness to look outside 
"scriptural" text as a source of doctrine, but an institutional 
"protestant" in his distrust of centralized, hierarchical interpre-
tive authority.16 By contrast, the American constitutional estab-
lishment emerges as the opposite over the course of Powell's 
narrative: constitutionalism develops a "protestant" obsession 
over texts while concentrating all power of moral pronounce-
ments within the "catholic" institution of the Supreme Court. 
Unfortunately, this transparent dichotomy between Powell's own 
catholic-protestant virtue and the Supreme Court's protestant-
catholic vice drains much of the suspense from The Moral Tradi-
tion. Unlike John Milton, whose dazzling, eloquent portrayal of 
Lucifer shed some doubt on the poet's stated quest to "justify the 
10. P. 8 n.20. 
11. Cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 837 
(1990) (describing the technique of "asking the woman question" as the first method by 
which feminists "do law"). 
12. John T. Noonan, Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 
1976). 
13. Id. at xii. 
14. P. 8. 
15. P. 8. 
16. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 27-53 (Princeton U. Press, 1988). 
Despite his willingness to consult extratextual sources of authority, Powell has stressed 
the importance of constitutional text. See H. Jefferson Powell, Parchment Matters: A 
Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1427 (1986). 
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ways of God to men,"t7 Powell relentlessly aims to expose the 
mocking imitation of divine order through secular law. 
Powell's central proposition springs from an imaginative 
modification of Alasdair Macintyre's catastrophe thesis, which 
posits that a rationalistic, individualistic society can never reach 
moral agreement.ts Ironically, Powell notes, the "Enlighten-
ment's parallel attempts to control irrational and violent action 
through the institution of the nation-state, and to replace irra-
tional, tradition-dependent moralities with universal norms of 
reason" gave rise to an American constitutionalism that devel-
oped a moral tradition of its own.19 Powell's description is 
neither novel nor problematic. The numerous grand theories in 
American law routinely justify themselves morally by claiming 
rational coherence. Indeed, many a grand theory invokes deter-
minacy as such as its exclusive moral justification.2o Moreover, 
legal scholars routinely study constitutional law as America's 
civic religion, complete with a sacred text, an ecclesiastical hier-
archy, a chronically alienated laity, and occasional holy wars.21 
Instead, treating American constitutional law as a moral tradi-
tion has far more important prescriptive implications for Powell's 
project. If "Christian theology and American constitutionalism 
share the intellectual and social structure [that are] characteristic 
of moral traditions," they become "in a significant sense rivals or 
competitors" for believers seeking a "rational exploration of the 
nature of human community and of the good life. "22 
In short, Powell is arguing that American constitutionalism 
has aspired to provide a moral tradition akin to Christianity's. If 
so, the American constitutional system has committed nothing 
less than what C.S. Lewis has called "the essential vice, the ut-
most evil": pride.23 Proud Lucifer aspired to a "throne above the 
stars of God,"24 and proud Eve swallowed the serpent's deceitful 
17. John Milton, Paradise Lost, Book I, I. 25 (1667). 
18. See Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 6-8, 36-50, 253-
54 (U. of Notre Dame Press, 2d ed. 1984); Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? 335 (U. of Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
19. P. 14. 
20. See, e.g., Antonio Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1175 (1989). The title speaks for itself. 
21. See, e.g., Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, eds., American Civil Religion 
(1974); Levinson, Constitutional Faith (cited in note 16); Thomas Grey, The Constitution 
as Scripture, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1984); George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of 
Antonin Scalia, 99 Yale L.J. 1297 (1990); Symposium, Religious Dimensions of American 
Constitutionalism, 39 Emory L.J. 1 (1990). 
22. P. 14. 
23. C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity 94 (Macmillan, 1943). 
24. Isaiah 14:13. 
1994-95] BOOK REVIEW 603 
promise that she and Adam could become "as gods, knowing 
good and evil."25 Just as J.R.R. Tolkien's evil Sauron molded 
grotesque orcs in a futile effort to imitate (or mock) God's crea-
tion,26 the American constitutionalism that Powell depicts has 
generated a tradition of false, treacherous claims to moral co-
gency. The sin also implicates those who are complicit in wield-
ing the Constitution's moral apparatus, for "[t]hose who put their 
faith in worldly order I . . . I Degrade what they exalt. "27 
The strength of this analogy ameliorates The Moral Tradi-
tion's largely perfunctory recitation of the familiar doctrinal pro-
gression from Calder v. Bull to Roe v. Wade. Powell's historical 
survey nevertheless displays momentary flashes of brilliance. For 
instance, Powell convincingly illustrates how liberal rationalism 
subverted the traditional common law's "nonliberal, pre-Enlight-
enment, tradition-dependent form of rational argument about 
justice. "zs Common law as practiced by Cook, Selden, and Hale 
relied less on a hidebound system of Euclidean logic than on the 
fluid concept of resoun. By treating resoun as "that which is rea-
sonable,"29 "that which is just, fair, moral,"3o or even "a believa-
ble story, an acceptable narrative,"31 common lawyers in the 
early eighteenth century were employing techniques that twenti-
eth-century jurisprudes often claim to have discovered anew.3z 
Powell largely blames Blackstone for the loss of the common 
law heritage. "[L]iterary felicity" and "relative compactness" 
helped the Commentaries sweep across book-starved America, 
but they also injected Enlightenment-inspired "analytical 'philos-
ophy' " into the common law at the time of the Constitution's 
framing.33 Thus began liberalism's gradual capture of a common 
law based on "a process of reasoning that was disciplined without 
being determinate in a quasi-geometrical fashion."34 But for 
Blackstone, American law might have retained the insight that 
conscious logic is only "the most superficial part" of human 
25. Genesis 3:5. 
26. J.R.R. Tolkien, The Two Towers 89 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 2d ed. 1965); see also 
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Return of the King 409-10 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 2d ed. 1965) (stat-
ing the origins of "orcdom"). 
27. T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral 30 (Faber, 1935). 
28. P. 76. 
29. Cf., e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (Little, Brown, 1960); 
George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949 (1985). 
30. E.g., Lloyd Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (Harv. U. Press, 1987). 
31. E.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 971 (1991). 
32. P. 78. 
33. P. 82 (quoting Thomas Green, Introduction, in 1 William Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England 5 (U. of Chi. Press, 1979)). 
34. P. 86. 
604 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:599 
thought.Js In Powell's eyes, therefore, the boast that the "origi-
nal and enduring American" model of law "sprang not from the 
philosophy of Nietzsche but from the jurisprudence of Black-
stone" has far more rhetorical panache than historical accuracy.36 
Powell might have more clearly distinguished between the 
institutional and the substantive dimensions of constitutionalism 
as a moral tradition. Powell skillfully documents how the ante-
bellum legal elite denigrated and eventually suppressed Con-
gress, the President, and even the legal academy as rivals in the 
Supreme Court's quest for exclusive authority to expound consti-
tutional morality.J7 He is noticeably less successful in communi-
cating how the judiciary has reoriented the Constitution's "moral 
compass" over time without abandoning the project of establish-
ing an autonomous civil morality. In other words, although the 
Supreme Court secured institutional supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation at a relatively early stage, incorrigible political vi-
cissitudes have constantly buffeted the substantive content of the 
Court's legal morality. But these moral shifts have never dimin-
ished the timbre of the Court's voice when it purports to speak ex 
cathedra. Powell never explicitly articulates this key point, leav-
ing his reader to intuit the content of constitutional morality 
from a compact historical survey of the slavery-induced constitu-
tional crisis, the brief rise and complete collapse of Radicalism, 
Lochnerism and the countervailing "modem theory," and con-
temporary doctrine of substantive due process. This flaw is espe-
cially crippling because the vernacular meaning of "morality" 
implies the existence of a fixed "moral anchor."Js A "moral tra-
dition" in Powell's sense, however, is necessarily dynamic, "con-
stituted by an ongoing argument in which its fundamental 
35. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 354, in RJ. Hollingdale ed. and trans., A 
Nietzsche Reader 66 (Harmondsworth, 1977); cf. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in 
Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 528 (1945) (quoting Alfred North Whitehead for the 
insight that "[c]ivilization advances by extending the number of important operations 
which we can perform without thinking"). 
36. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. a. 2510, 2523 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
37. Pp. 111-17; see also H. Jefferson Powell, Book Review, Enslaved to Judicial 
Supremacy?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1198-1204 (1993). Contra Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. LJ. 
(forthcoming 1994) (arguing that the President has the right-indeed, the obligation-to 
nullify judgments contrary to transcendently correct law); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 
Cardozo L. Rev. 81 (1993) (same). 
38. See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 771 (Merriam-Webster, 
1989) ("moral implies conformity to established sanctioned codes or accepted notions of 
right and wrong" (emphasis added)). 
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agreements are expressed, defined, and revised."39 So significant 
a conceit deserves far clearer explanation. 
Powell's real strength lies in his ability to expose the rhetori-
cal poise and political duplicity with which the Court adopts new 
moral paradigms. The Court may have momentarily prevented 
its revolution against Lochner v. New York from inflicting collat-
eral damage on "discrete and insular minorities,"40 but the self-
dealing nature of constitutional morality quickly resurfaced in 
the Court's modem substantive due process decisions. In a novel 
twist on the Supreme Court's decisions involving contraception 
and abortion, Powell argues that Griswold v. Connecticut could 
be defended as a thoroughly traditional common law effort to 
nudge the fuzzy boundaries of vague constitutional "penumbras, 
formed by emanations" from specific provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.4t To Powell, American constitutionalism's most recent 
intellectual crisis began a full year before Roe v. Wade, when the 
invalidation of a statute criminalizing the distribution of contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird4z completed 
the Enlightenment's conquest of the Constitution's vulnerable 
morality. Having abandoned the project of incorporating "the 
disadvantaged into an enriched political community itself consti-
tuted in part by other communities (religious, familial, and so 
on)" through the admittedly "statist and 'rights' oriented" ideol-
ogy of United States v. Carolene Products,43 the Court in Eisen-
stadt "denied the legitimacy of any moral content to American 
political organization beyond the protection of the atomistic indi-
vidual against intrusion. "44 
This is an oft-told tale, and to hear Powell retell it does have 
occasional rewards. Powell, however, is by no means the first 
scholar to note how modem jurisprudence has deified the law in 
an effort to fill the spiritual vacuum left by the Enlightenment. 
Harold Berman, for example, has identified three distinct strands 
of legal deification: positivists "deify the state," naturalists "deify 
39. P. 24; cf. Macintyre, After Virtue at 222 (cited in note 18) (noting that traditions 
"decay, disintegrate and disappear" when internal rational mechanisms fail or when they 
become corrupted by external influences). 
40. United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); cf. Springer v. Philippine Is-
lands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[e]ven the more 
specific" provisions of the Constitution "are found to terminate in a penumbra shading 
gradually from one extreme to the other"). 
42. 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
43. United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
44. P. 177. 
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the mind," and historicists "deify the people, the nation."45 Pow-
ell's contribution is a ruthless expose of the Supreme Court's at-
tempt to deify itself, the liberal jurisprudence that it inherited 
from the Enlightenment, and the civil order embodied in the 
Constitution.46 Thus, in light of the Court's claim that its "obli-
gation is to define the liberty of all," the concomitant protest that 
the Court does not "mandate [its] own moral code" is patently 
fraudulent. 47 Within a constitutional catechism on abortion in 
which "liberty" is quite literally the first and the last word,4B the 
Justices plainly view themselves as Alpha and Omega within the 
civic covenant that binds succeeding generations of Americans to 
the framers of the Constitution. 49 
Powell hits his stride in a methodical refutation of traditional 
scholars' efforts to "modify or reject the [constitutional] tradi-
tion's long-standing claim to autonomy ... and instead explicitly 
identify constitutionalism as a form" of "philosophy, morality, or 
extralegal politics. "5o John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcing 
theory of judicial review5t cannot liberate judges from the re-
sponsibility of making "substantive political and moral 
choices."52 Bruce Ackerman's apology for morally desirable ju-
dicial decisions53 rests on the implausible "political myth" of "a 
People that acts in identifiable ways and speaks in comprehensi-
ble tones. "54 A similarly hapless struggle to identify a national 
community swamps the neo-republican theories of Cass Sun-
45. Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, His-
tory, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 779, 783 (1988). 
46. Cf. Powell, Parchment Matters (cited in note 16). 
47. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992). 
48. Id.at 2803 ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."), 2833 ("We 
invoke (the Court's obligation] once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Con-
stitution's own promise, the promise of liberty."); see also id.at 2807 (arguing that "per-
sonal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education" merit the Fourteenth Amendment's full protection of the 
liberty interest in "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life"). 
49. Compare Revelation 1:8,21:6,22:13 with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2833. 
50. P. 184. 
51. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harv. U. Press, 1980); see also John 
Hart Ely, The WDges of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 
(1973). 
52. P. 189. 
53. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 1991); 
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985); Bruce Acker-
man, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale LJ. 453 (1989); Bruce Ackerman, 
Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013 (1984). 
54. Pp. 201, 200. 
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steinss and Frank Michelman.s6 Powell reaches peak critical 
form when he snags Mark Thshnets7 and Robert Borkss in the 
same intellectual web. Both Thshnet and Bork "want to reject 
liberal individualism and to recognize the role of the community 
in forming morality," but both eventually concede that no such 
community exists.s9 As Powell concludes, "[t]hat a leading so-
cialist CLS professor and a 'conservative' Republican judge have 
so much in common at the most fundamental intellectual level 
tells us something very important about American constitutional-
ism. "60 Powell's effective application of the "trashing" technique 
echoes Tushnet's own exasperated conclusion about American 
constitutional thinking: "Critique is all there is. "61 
If Powell is amused at the failure of religiously neutral ef-
forts to rationalize American constitutionalism, he becomes com-
pletely agitated when he examines "the assimilation of Christian 
social thought and action to the supposed constraints of political 
realism."62 Just as Robert Bork warned against the political se-
duction of the law, Powell denounces the tempting of Christen-
dom, the legal seduction of theology. Powell accordingly 
reserves his most virulent venom for "Constantinian" Christian 
scholars who "see in the American political system a precursor or 
embodiment of the kingdom of God."63 Mild Constantinians 
such as John Neuhaus and John Noonan commit the "double-
barrel error" of "simultaneously accepting as normative the coer-
cive nature of the state while overstating egregiously the signifi-
cance of having individual Christians exercise the state's 
power."64 The archetypical Constantinian, Michael Perry, "effec-
tively collapses Christian ethics into contemporary constitution-
55. See Cass Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (1990); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Revival, 97 Yale L. Rev. 1539 (1988). 
56. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank 
Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986). 
57. See Mark V. Thshnet, Red, White and Blue:A Critical Analysis of Constitutional 
Law (Harv. U. Press, 1988). 
58. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the 
Law (The Free Press, 1990). 
59. P. 254. 
60. P. 254. 
61. Thshnet, Red, White and Blue at 318 (cited in note 56); cf. Arthur Allen Leff, 
Law and, 87 Yale L.J. 989, 1011 (1978) ("[A]II we can-understand, and that not very well, 
are the games we ourselves generate and eventually, but predictably, lose."). 
62. P. 260. 
63. P. 261. Powell borrows the term "Constantinian" from John Howard Yoder, The 
Priestly Kingdom· Social Ethics as Gospel135-47 (U. of Notre Dame Press, 1984), and 
Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today 180-84 (Labyrinth Press, 1988). 
64. P. 276 (criticizing John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square (W.B. Eerdmans, 
1984), and Noonan, Persons and Masks of the Law (cited in note 12)). 
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alism" and thereby undermines the church's ability "to engage in 
authentic Christian social criticism. "6s 
Once Powell finishes administering an acid bath to theologi-
cal apologies for the American constitutional order, a remarka-
ble coincidence emerges. Constantinian jurisprudence is the 
Blackstonian beast reborn and swaddled in the vestments of illu-
sory priestly virtue. All of the competing jurisprudential models 
depicted in The Moral Tradition-conventional constitutional-
ism, the Constantinian variation, and Powell's Augustinian alter-
native-view majoritarian politics as prone to violence. All 
three schools treat the political system as the product of the Fall, 
of the original sin that permeates all elected officials as they 
"pass[ ] from the stink of the didie to the stench of the shroud. "66 
As a cure, Blackstone prescribed principled, rational judicial rea-
soning.67 The defenders of the social morality that is American 
constitutionalism have done no more than debate the principles. 
Constantinian jurisprudence merely substitutes Christian ethics 
as practiced by virtuous judges for the liberal rationalism prac-
ticed by Blackstone's principled judges. Ultimately, both schools 
place their hope for redemption in the legal process. Con-
founded by the brutality of majoritarian politics, both Black-
stonian and Constantinian jurists respond, "I know that my 
Redeemer adjudicates. "68 
As an alternative to the Constantinians' Panglossian piety, 
Powell offers what he calls the Augustinian justification for de-
mocracy and judicial review. St. Augustine's jurisprudence de-
nied that the moral value of a law had any necessary connection 
to the personal virtue of the secular lawmaker. Accordingly, "a 
good law can be enacted by a lawgiver who is not good," for such 
a "law is not evil just because it was made by an unjust and cor-
rupt lawmaker."69 Conversely, even virtuous "laws enacted for 
the government of cities" and nations may "make many conces-
sions and leave unpunished many crimes which are nevertheless 
punished by Divine Providence. "7o For St. Augustine, the tem-
poral glory of the Roman Empire-measured by "ample terri-
65. Pp. 276-77; see also pp. 208-24 (criticizing Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, 
The Courts, and Human Rights (Yale Univ. Press, 1982), and Michael J. Perry, Morality, 
Politics, and Law (Oxford U. Press, 1988)). 
66. See, e.g., Robert Penn Warren, All the King's Men 49 (Harcourt, Brace, 1946; 
rpt. 1982). 
67. See generally 1 Blackstone at ••63-92 (cited in note 32). 
68. Cf. Job 19:25. 
69. St. Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will, in 59 The Fathers of the Church 63,82 
(Robert P. Russell trans. 1968). 
70. Id.at 83. 
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tory and long duration"-did not vindicate the pagan religion of 
the early Caesars.11 In Powell's modern city of God, democracy 
tempers the inherent violence of the secular state by reminding 
its leaders of the ephemeral nature of their power and by corrod-
ing the law's unattainable claim to transcendent truth. The influ-
ence of Critical Legal Studies is undeniable: Powell assumes that 
law embodies and inevitably enforces the political preferences of 
a privileged class, that law denies its own contingency, and that 
the law's claim to formal, discoverable coherence is noxiously 
fraudulent. Attempting to infuse theological rigor cannot cure 
the law's organic indeterminacy. In attempting to Christianize 
the secular state, Emperor Constantine's twentieth-century intel-
lectual heirs have merely enabled the state to confiscate the rhet-
oric and moral authority of the church. 
Ultimately, Powell's positive case-what he affirmatively ex-
horts Christian lawyers to do-consists of only a few, very mod-
est propositions, all stated at a high level of abstraction. He 
starts from the initial premise that Christian theology provides 
"no general principle ... for deciding in the abstract the proper 
balance between majoritarian and judicial decision making."n 
He nevertheless recognizes the need for some standard by which 
Christians can weigh the relative merits of judicial deference and 
of judicial activism. In rejecting the argument that insulation 
from political passions warrants a preference for adjudication 
over legislation, Powell makes a stark sociological observation 
worthy of Mark Thshnet: "Judges, and especially federal judges, 
belong overwhelmingly to an educated upper-middle class not 
notable for its responsiveness to Christian commitments. "73 In-
stead, the nominal possibility that the electoral process can re-
verse legislative decisions generally counsels judicial deference to 
legislative policy judgments. This scrap of humility has the Au-
71. 1St. Augustine, The City of God 142 {Hafner Publishing, Marcus Dods trans. & 
ed. 1948). 
72. P. W. 
73. P. 288; see alsop. 288 n.l13 (noting that "the education and professionalization 
of most judges ... privatiz(e] whatever religious beliefs they hold and shap[e] their judi-
cial behavior to conform to the deeply secularized and intensely individualistic values of 
their social class"); cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief How American Law 
and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 1-11, 23-24 (Basic Books, 1993) (noting wide-
spread hostility to religion in most intellectual circles); Sanford Levinson, Book Review, 
Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 2061, 2062 (1992) (noting 
the relative lack of attention to "claims of exclusion and silencing made by those with 
strong religious commitments"); David M. Smolin, Book Review, Regulating Religious 
and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1067, 1067-68 (1992) ("demand(ing]" that "academic and legal elites cease their re-
pression" of "Christian traditionalists"). 
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gustinian virtue of reminding the state's agents that their power 
is evanescent, that secular law can never pronounce transcendent 
truth. Out of a vast sea of possibilities suggested by the courts 
and the commentators, Powell extracts three exceptions to his 
general rule of judicial deference: protection of racial, religious, 
and other minorities under a Carolene Products rationale; a pro-
cess-sensitive patrol against the suppression of free expression; 
and enforcement of the procedural due process ideals of reliabil-
ity and regularity.74 "There is no Christian constitutionalism," 
Powell concludes; "Caesar remains Caesar."75 
Ironically, for someone who has rejected a Christian theory 
of Critical Legal Studies as a "nightmare" that would 
subordinate faith, hope, and love to " 'fuller forms of self-asser-
tion and attachment,"76 Powell has outlined a CLS approach to 
Christian Legal Studies. Powell finds no aspect of law more the-
ologically pernicious than its "language of permanence, of settled 
decision, of absolute political value. "77 To lend the language of 
divine immanence to the law is to confer the attributes of God on 
law. What Duncan Kennedy condemns as reification of the 
law,1s Powell decries as deification of the law. According to Pow-
ell's theology, there may be no greater jurisprudential offense 
than this blasphemous transformation of the Gospel of John: "In 
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with the Law, 
and the Word was Law."79 The Supreme Court's acceptance of 
constitutionalism as the American social morality erects legal al-
tars "to [an] unknown god," in defiance of the Christian precept 
that the "lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made 
with hands."so Constantinian jurisprudence, Powell argues per-
suasively, can no more nullify the law's idolatry than the hands of 
Israel can shape a graven image pleasing to God.st Arguably, a 
consciously Christianized constitutionalism might be even worse 
74. Pp. 289-91. 
75. P. 292. 
76. H. Jefferson Powell, The Gospel According to Roberto: A Theological Polemic, 
1988 Duke L.J. 1013, 1026 (quoting Roberto Unger, False Necessity and Anti-Necessitar-
ian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy 575 (Cambridge U. Press, 1987)). 
77. P. 289. 
78. Cf., e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on 
the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 939 (1985). 
79. See John 1:1; cf. Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia at 1320 
(cited in note 21) (describing this formula as "the short and simple recipe for a catecheti-
cal Constitution"). 
80. Acts 17:23-24. 
81. Cf. Exodus 32 (describing Aaron's creation of the golden calf); Steven D. Smith, 
Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Va. L. Rev. 583, 610-13 (1993) (using the bibli-
cal account to illustrate the allure of idolatry in law). 
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than the purely secular variety. The historical Caesar that Powell 
vilifies is, after all, Constantine the pious princeps, not Diocletian 
the maker of martyrs. 
Like many of its counterparts in the secular CLS movement, 
Powell's theological theory is far more effective as a weapon of 
destructive description than as a tool of constructive prescrip-
tion.82 Powell has concocted a legal theory so corrosive that it 
virtually consumes itself. The Moral Tradition dissolves even its 
own limited case for Christian judicial activism. In endorsing 
Carolene Products' model of judicial review, Powell overlooks 
the well-established tendency of discrete and insular minorities 
to convert judicial shelter into political advantage.s3 Powell also 
understates the politicized nature of the judicial process itself.84 
At its extreme, his reductionist theory erases any possibility for 
stating a theologically sound Christian agenda within the legal 
process. Total human depravity infects the courtroom and the 
campaign trail equally. The cure lies not in the "works of right-
eousness which we have done," but in the mercy and irresistible 
grace of God.ss From this perspective, Christian lawyering con-
sists simply of seeking justice, loving mercy, and walking humbly 
with God.86 
Whatever its flaws, Powell's critique of constitutionalism 
does follow sound theological instincts. He reminds the other 
leading figures of Christian Legal Studies of the dangers of apol-
ogizing too readily for the law. When asked whether the Roman 
state should crucify the presumed King of the Jews, the chief 
priests of God's chosen people responded, "We have no king but 
Caesar."s7 Even in its silence, The Moral Tradition may also 
have a message for Christians in the legal laity. Perhaps uninten-
tionally, Powell's repeated invocations of the compassion embod-
82. Cf. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 
Law & Soc. Inquiry 779 (1992). 
83. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & PhilipP. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Criti· 
cal Introduction 12-37 (U. Chi. Press, 1991); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Prod· 
ucts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985); Geoffrey Miller, The True Story ofCarolene Products, 
1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 397. 
84. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Coun, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 
814-23 (1982); Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale 
L.J. 1219, 1229-33 (1994); cf. Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial 
Power, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 281, 293-302 (1994) (arguing that self-dealing political behavior 
also infects judicial staff). 
85. See Titus 3:5-7. 
86. See Micah 6:8. 
87. John 19:15. But cf. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). 
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ied in the Beatitudesss and the Great Cmnmandmentss9 deliver a 
timely message to a Christian community prone to fall into the 
trap of placing "sins of the flesh" at "the centre of Christian mo-
rality," prone to forget that "a cold, self-righteous prig who regu-
larly goes to church may be far nearer to hell than a prostitute. "90 
Even if short on specifics, Powell's tract may inspire theological 
introspection in an age when religious social activism too often 
suggests that Christianity has no relevance after birth and before 
death. 
The historical schism between Western and Eastern Christi-
anity provides one final gauge by which to judge The Moral Tra-
dition. Whereas the Western church has traditionally aspired to 
become the state, the Eastern church has sought to transform the 
state into the church.91 Having endorsed Macintyre's catastro-
phe thesis, Powell expends minimal energy in implicitly dis-
missing the "Western" sort of social activism most often 
associated with contemporary political campaigns overtly seeking 
the support of Christian voters. In distinct but equally inimical 
ways, both secular constitutionalists and Constantinian juris-
prudes have been working toward an "Eastern" transfiguration 
of the positive state into the church. Exalting America's liberal 
social morality effectively treats the constitutional state as a sub-
stitute for the church, a secular competitor for ecclesiastical au-
thority. Likewise, Constantinian jurisprudence seeks to redeem 
the state by making it a vassal of the church, a novice to be 
taught the church's more virtuous morality. According to Pow-
ell, neither response warrants Christian support. Worldly power 
was one of the temptations that Satan offered Christ.92 Christ 
declined, instead founding a countervailing kingdom that is ex-
plicitly "not of this world. "93 
The Roman Empire's implementation of Western law on 
Eastern soil provided the historical context in which Christianity 
itself emerged. Ever the historian, Powell argues that the rela-
tionship between Caesar and God has scarcely changed since 
Christ's first sojourn on earth. The Moral Tradition shows how 
88. See Matthew 5:3-7:27; Luke 6:20-49. 
89. See Matthew 22:36-40; Mark 12:29-34; Luke 11:25-28. 
90. Lewis, Mere Christianity at 80 (cited in note 23); see also John 8:7. 
91. See Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers KaramDr.ov 66 (Constance Garnett Hein-
emann, trans. 1968) (" '[T)he Church is not to be transformed into the State. That is 
Rome and its dream .... On the contrary, the State is transformed into the Church, will 
ascend and become a Church over the whole world-which is . . . only the glorious 
destiny ordained for the Orthodox Church. This star will arise in the east!'"). 
92. See Matthew 4:8-10; Luke 4:5-8. 
93. John 18:36. 
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American constitutionalism has elaborated the realizable rules 
and formal rationality of Roman laW94 into a full-blown, self-con-
tained system of social morality. In America as in Rome, the 
legal apparatus of the secular state continues to ask, "What is 
truth?"9s Powell's accomplishment is a powerful demonstration 
that neither twenty centuries of legal evolution nor twenty de-
cades of American constitutionalism bring Caesar any closer to 
answering this question on his own. 
BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRE-
SENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CON-
GRESS. By Carol M. Swain.I Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 275. 
Daniel A. Farbetl 
For the past twenty years, the federal courts have been vig-
orously engaged in racial redistricting. Recently, this involve-
ment was attacked by the only black member of the current 
Court. In his concurring opinion in Holder v. Hal/,3 Justice 
Thomas challenged the conceptual basis for race-based reappor-
tionment. A contrary view, represented by writers such as Lani 
Guinier, is that current judicial efforts do not go nearly far 
enough. This viewpoint is exemplified by Randall Kennedy's 
harsh review of Black Faces, Black Interests in Reconstruction.4 
Notably, this debate about redistricting is not merely taking place 
between blacks and whites but also among blacks themselves-
Kennedy, Guinier, and Swain are all African American. 
Unlike many other contributions to this debate, the Swain 
book is richly empirical. Besides the multiple-regression analy-
ses that are the staple of modem social science, Professor Swain 
presents the results of several years of patient interviews with 
94. See generally Rudolph von ]bering, Der Geist Des Romischen Rechts § 4, at 50-
55 (1883). 
95. John 18:38. 
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